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As a response to alcohol-related disorderly behaviours, the use of exclusion has expanded 
steadily across Australian jurisdictions but with minimal analysis of its effects. Bans, from 
public or private locations, are typically imposed summarily and presumed to be a 
meaningful deterrent to future problematic behaviours. The formalisation of licensee 
banning powers has created a civilianised police-enforceable power to punish by exclusion. 
 
In Victoria, the legislative framing of licensee barring order provisions precludes formal 
monitoring of their use. This article reports findings from interviews conducted with 
recipients. The conceptual and situational value of barring orders are acknowledged, but 
their capacity to act as a tangible deterrent or effective agent for behaviour change is far from 
conclusive. 
 
Barring orders constitute a civilianised summary power, which currently operates without 
scrutiny or accountability. Implications for the operational legitimacy of barring powers 
emerge from this study, in addition to broader considerations with respect to compliance, 
enforcement, oversight, and the importance of developing and examining alcohol policies 
through a gendered lens. 
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Introduction 
 
Entertainment districts are contested spaces and, over the last two decades, an increasing body of 
regulation and legislation has sought to govern, manage and control alcohol consumption and associated 
patron behaviours (Hadfield, Lister and Traynor 2009; Hobbs et al. 2003; Taylor et al. 2018). Across 
Australia, violence and disorder in and around licensed premises have prompted the implementation of 
an expansive range of policies and operational policing initiatives. High-profile responses, such as lock-out 
laws introduced in Sydney in 2014, and Queensland’s 2017 implementation of compulsory ID scanners at 
key licensed venues, have generated extensive debate and analysis regarding their need and effect, and the 
broader context of expanding governance and control (Donnelly and Poynton 2019; McNamara and 
Quilter 2015; Menendez et al. 2015, 2016; Miller et al. 2017, 2019). A key element of the regulation of 
entertainment districts is the use of spatial exclusion and patron banning, which has expanded across all 
Australian jurisdictions with minimal scrutiny (Farmer 2019, 2020; Farmer and Clifford 2020; Farmer et 
al. 2018; Palmer and Warren 2014). Banning achieves a practical and political need to address alcohol-
related issues and finds little opposition from the liquor industry and other key stakeholders (Miller et al. 
2016). Banning provisions differ across jurisdictions (Farmer and Clifford 2020) but a common 
presumption is that the experience, or risk, of exclusion from a venue and/or local area will deter 
troublesome patrons (Farmer et al., 2018). However, without formal oversight of its use or effects, patron 
banning has become a politically expedient example of ‘being seen to do something’ rather than a genuine 
mechanism to promote tangible and sustainable behaviour change (Farmer 2019, 2020; Farmer, Clifford 
and Miller 2020).  
 
This article focuses upon venue specific barring orders in the Australian state of Victoria. Licensee barring 
orders are discretionary police-enforceable sanctions, imposed on-the-spot by ordinary citizens. Barring 
orders exclude individuals from a venue, limit freedom to move in its vicinity, and are expected to have a 
transformative effect upon the behaviour of the recipient and the community more broadly. Barring sits 
within a largely linear model of undesirable behaviour - response - and attendant deterrence. To date, 
there has been limited evidence-based analysis of the extent to which any type of patron banning 
influences the future behaviour of recipients.1 The study from which this article is drawn was the first in 
Australia to engage directly with ban recipients, using in-depth interviews to explore how they perceived 
and responded to their ban. The particular focus of this article is the deterrent effect of licensee barring 
orders.2  Key perspectives relating to deterrence theories, displacement, exclusion and legitimacy provide 
a theoretical and conceptual framework for the study.3 The rationale for Victoria’s licensee barring powers 
and the core assumptions upon which their implementation is predicated are then briefly examined. An 
explanation of the research approach is followed by the articulation and discussion of key interview 
findings. The article concludes by highlighting limitations that are evident with respect to the deterrent 
effects of licensee barring orders, positions the findings within broader concerns about the attendant 
civilianisation of punishment, and recommends further examination of the gendered dynamics that are 
evident in this study. 
 
Deterrence, Displacement and Exclusion 
 
Patron banning in general, and licensee barring in particular, fit within a model of contractual governance 
(Crawford 2003), which individualises regulation (Room 2012) and draws upon a presumption of rational 
decision-making. Complex constructions of behavioural theory have been examined in relation to a range 
of criminological, sociological, geo-spatial and psychological contexts (Tonry 2008; Von Hirsch et al. 1999). 
Of particular relevance to this article is the notion of perceptual deterrence, whereby individuals weigh up 
the possible benefits of a given act or behaviour against the probable risks - notably the likelihood, celerity 
and severity of punishment or sanction (Becker 1968; Mann et al. 2016). To be effective, a deterrent must 
be sufficient to factor into an individual decision to behave in particular way – but individuals are 
influenced by a complex blend of personal, social, situational, contextual, psychological, attitudinal and 
risk-related factors (Miller et al. 2013; Taylor, Keatley and Clarke 2020). For example, surveillance and 
enforcement mechanisms deployed within the night-time economy (NTE), such as the proximity of police 
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officers, visible CCTV, or the use ID scanners to identify patrons as they enter venues have the potential to 
influence behaviours, but the precise deterrent effects are variable and far from conclusive (Ariel, Bland 
and Sutherland 2017; De Andrade et al. 2020; Piza et al. 2019). Perceptions regarding risk or certainty of 
a sanction are individualised and the consequences are not homogeneous. Some people are more deterred 
than others, with the level of deterrence reflecting a range of variables and circumstances (Matthews and 
Agnew 2008; McGrath 2009). Individual deterrability embodies the extent to which a person has a 
propensity to perceptual deterrence in any given situation (Jacobs 2010).  
 
The remit of deterrence is broad, and the effects are neither uni-directional nor siloed. Deterrence can 
apply to individuals receiving a particular penalty, more generally to the community through the perceived 
risk of a sanction being imposed and enforced, or it can reflect more intricate intersections of specific and 
general effects. Within the NTE, the confounding effects of alcohol or drug consumption upon cognisance, 
rational thinking and risk informed decision-making further complicates the paradigm of perceptual 
deterrence and deterrability. Across a multi-jurisdictional body of research, clear links have been 
established between alcohol consumption, anti-social and other disorderly behaviours (Fleming 2008; 
Graham and Homel 2008; Hadfield, Lister and Traynor 2009; Hughes et al. 2008; Mawby 2017; McNamara 
and Quilter 2015; Miller et al. 2015). The effects of alcohol on decision-making, violence and disorder are 
evident, but complex.  
 
Patron banning is one of a range of provisions implemented to manage problematic behaviours across the 
NTE. As a summary penalty, bans issued on-the-spot immediately remove an individual from a given 
location. However, the potential for the temporal or spatial displacement of undesirable behaviours has 
been demonstrated to varying degrees with respect to other mechanisms tackling alcohol-related issues 
in the NTE, and anti-social or criminal acts in other contexts (De Andrade, Homel and Townsley 2018; 
Menendez et al. 2015; Sylvestre et al. 2015; Wadds 2019). For example, following the implementation of 
Sydney’s lock-out laws, non-domestic assaults decreased in the affected precincts, but rose by 18% in 
surrounding suburbs (Donnelly and Poynton 2019). In Queensland, the effect of ID scanners is mitigated 
by time-limited use, enabling patrons to enter venues without detection (De Andrade et al. 2020). In 
England, Stafford (2019) found that individuals excluded from Business Crime Reduction Partnership4 
locations (following theft, disorder or other anti-social behaviours) typically continued to offend in other 
locations. Without comprehensive coverage and/or effective enforcement, the potential deterrent effect 
of exclusion is fundamentally compromised by the capacity to simply go elsewhere. 
 
Mechanisms to exclude recipients from public or private domains operate across a range of international 
criminal justice contexts. Common themes underpin the framing of each provision and assume effects 
upon the future undesirable behaviours of recipients, and of the community more broadly. However, the 
specific individualised deterrent effects of such localised, summary penalties are far from conclusive. In an 
examination of dispersal orders and other exclusionary powers in England and Wales, Crawford (2009) 
depicted a ‘net-widening’ effect of policing by summary justice but with limited consequences for 
disorderly behaviours. Since 2014, Public Spaces Protection Orders (PSPOs) have empowered local 
authorities to apply prohibitions within specific public areas across England and Wales. Heap and 
Dickinson (2018) contend that PSPOs constitute an unregulated and almost unlimited power to prohibit 
or exclude, but there is little evidence to support their presumed beneficial effects on behaviour and/or 
community safety (Johnstone 2017). In Seattle, USA, police officers are permitted to issue on-the-spot 
exclusion orders from public spaces, which can last for up to a year. In common with Crawford (2009), 
Beckett and Herbert (2010) found that the Seattle provisions progressively increased the likelihood of 
infringement and punishment, but without demonstrable effects upon behaviour. Belina (2007) critiqued 
the arbitrary and reductive nature of summary police banning powers in Bremen, Germany and observed 
that the resulting dislocation of ‘undesirables’ reflected a spatialization of risk that did little to change 
individual behaviour or assure community safety. In a study of responses to police zonal banning powers 
in Denmark, Sogaard (2018) found that bans were routinely disregarded, had limited value as a specific 
deterrent, and fear of being banned exacerbated rather than deterred anti-social behaviours. 
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To date, no study has established the effects of any of Australia’s banning provisions on recipients, in terms 
of their perceptions, compliance, or subsequent behavioural decision-making. Palmer and Warren (2014) 
and Farmer (2017, 2019, 2020) identified and examined key conceptual concerns regarding the use of 
exclusion in public spaces, the arbitrary application of discretionary powers to punish, and the 
implications for individual rights. Curtis et al. (2018) explored public understanding of patron banning in 
Victoria via an online questionnaire. As the majority of respondents demonstrated little knowledge, Curtis 
et al. questioned the extent to which banning fulfils the expectations of a general deterrent. In a series of 
interviews with key stakeholders, Miller et al. (2016) examined the perceived effects of patron banning 
and determined that banning is regarded as a deterrent to anti-social behaviours. However, the study did 
not engage with recipients of patron bans to understand their perceptions or how they responded to their 
ban – including whether they simply continued their behaviour in another location.  
 
Licensed venues are private spaces and the right to exclude is embedded within long-standing common 
law principles. Across Australian jurisdictions, codification has steadily formalised and expanded licensee 
barring powers.5 Barring orders are non-criminal sanctions, enforced via a range of infringement 
mechanisms which may result in a fine or court proceedings. Farmer (2019, 2020) documented conceptual 
and operational issues regarding the lack of specific training for licensees, and the principle of empowering 
ordinary citizens to punish without implementing a supporting structure of accountability. Despite their 
formal nature and the potential consequences of a breach, in most Australian jurisdictions there is limited 
facility for independent review of a licensee decision to ban, and their use is subject to little scrutiny 
(Farmer 2019, 2020). The propriety of permitting non-law enforcement officers to issue legally 
enforceable sanctions and attendant perceptions of the legitimacy of such quasi-criminal processes aligns 
with an extensive body of research examining policing legitimacy (Tyler and Jackson 2014; Tyler and 
Wakslak 2004; Wadds 2015). Even for routine interactions, such as traffic stops, perceptions of procedural 
justice and operational fairness are essential prerequisites for individual and community compliance, co-
operation, and trust (Huq, Jackson and Trinkner 2017; Mazerolle et al. 2013; Tankebe and Liebling 2013). 
It is reasonable to presume similar perceptions and expectations with respect to non-police powers to 
exclude.  
 
Victoria’s Licensee Barring Provisions: Rationale, Assumptions and Deterrence 
 
Victoria’s licensee barring order provisions are set out in sections 106C-K of the Justice Legislation 
Amendment Act 2011, which amended the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998, and came into effect in May 
2011. Barring orders are intended for those who are ‘“drunk, violent or quarrelsome” in the licensed 
premises or its vicinity, and can be imposed by the licensee or another responsible person. The permissible 
length is up to one month for first time recipients and up to six months where two or more previous orders 
have been imposed. Recipients do not have recourse to legal advice or representation. Barring order 
breaches are dealt with as criminal matters, with a potential fine that is court enforceable. The ‘vicinity’ of 
a licensed premises is defined as ‘a public place that is within 20 metres of the licensed premises, but is 
not the licensed premises.’ (Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2011, part 2 ‘definitions’). The geographical 
scope of a licensee barring order extends well beyond the private domain of the venue and may include 
pavements, thoroughfares, car parks, and any other contiguous public area. 
 
Across the parliamentary debates of the Justice Legislation Amendment Bill,6 in March, April and May 
2011, the operational legitimacy and presumed deterrent and community safety effects of the provisions 
were discussed in depth. Some concern was articulated in relation to imposition mechanisms, 
enforcement, monitoring, and the diminution of civil liberties. Proponents of the Bill countered these 
concerns with broadly framed notions of protection and safety, typified by this assertion: 
 
These barring orders … are important in reducing violent incidents outside licensed premises 
and protecting the safety of patrons within the vicinity… (Legislative Assembly 2011: 586-87 
[O’Brien]) 
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In response to a request to explain how barring orders would reduce alcohol-related harm, the Minister 
directly linked exclusion with specific and general deterrence, but offered no empirical or other evaluative 
evidence:   
 
The government’s intention with respect to this clause is to remove those people who have 
been causing trouble from those licensed venues… The point of increasing penalties for 
offences is for the provision to act as a deterrent. Clearly if there is a greater penalty, there will 
be a deterrent, and that is what the government is seeking to achieve. (Legislative Council 
2011: 1066 [Guy]) 
 
A licensee-imposed barring order can remove a troublesome individual from a given situation for a fixed 
period of a time. The ban is also expected to deter the recipient from engaging in similar behaviours again, 
particularly where subsequent transgressions may lead to more onerous periods of exclusion. Since their 
implementation, Victoria’s licensee barring order provisions have been the subject of no formal scrutiny. 
There is no monitoring of their use, and any effects of licensee barring are not measured. The 2011 
legislation precludes licensees from sharing barring order data other than for the purposes of enforcement 
(Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2011, s.106K). A direct request to the licensing regulatory body, the 
Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR), for assistance to establish the 
quantum of barring orders imposed to date was denied. The 2011 legislation was cited as the reason for 
the absence of any barring order data (personal email to author, 10 May 2019).  
 
The introduction of licensee barring orders reflects assertion rather than empirical evidence. This is a 
particular concern in Victoria, where the requirements of the 2006 Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities (‘the Charter’) requires all legislation which may limit a core individual right (including the 
freedom to move, the right to a fair hearing or legal representation) to be supported with demonstrable 
evidence of need and effect.7 Licensee barring orders limit freedom to move and are imposed on-the-spot 
by ordinary citizens. Yet compliance with the Charter expectations is not evident in relation to the 
legislation which introduced licensee barring. A clear gap exists with respect to the presumed deterrent 
effects of Victoria’s licensee barring orders, and demonstrable understanding and evidence of the actual 




This study draws upon in-depth interviews with individuals who have received a licensee barring order in 
Victoria. Ethical approval was provided by the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee: 
reference 2018-287. There is no central record of Victoria’s venue barring orders, as no data are collected 
or published. Licensees record and retain barring order information for three years, after which it must be 
destroyed. The VCGLR does not monitor the use of barring powers, gather or maintain any records (email 
to the author, 10 May 2019). Therefore, there is currently no data through which the use or effects of 
licensee barring orders can be examined.  
 
Participants 
Interviews were conducted with 15 individuals who had received at least one licensee barring order 
anywhere in Victoria. A range of print, online and social media communication channels were used to 
publicise the research, including Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and the Victorian newspapers Geelong 
Advertiser and Herald Sun (shared online across NewsCorp Australia8). Prospective participants were 
invited to contact the research team via a dedicated project email address. A plain language statement was 
sent to each prospective participant, and those who wished to proceed were asked to return a signed 
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Procedure and Analysis 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format, with core questions posed to each participant and 
additional questions dependent upon the responses. Interview length ranged from 25 to 55 minutes; each 
was recorded and transcribed by the interviewer. The interviews focused upon the process through which 
the barring orders were imposed, how recipients perceived their ban, as well as their immediate and 
longer-term responses.  
 
Each of the 15 participants has been assigned a random numerical identifier, from P1 to P15. The interview 
transcripts were coded by a single researcher using thematic analyses within a grounded theory approach. 
The coding drew out findings in relation to the themes of compliance; implementation perceptions, 
process and proportionality; transformational effects upon attitudes and behaviours (for recipients and 
wider peer groups); practical and emotional responses; legitimacy; and perceived deterrent effects (both 
specifically and more broadly). 
 
Limitations 
Participants self-selected and are not necessarily representative of barred patrons. Legislative restrictions 
placed upon the sharing of barring order information, and the absence of any formal data, make it 
impossible to discern a representative sample. It is recognised that those who chose to participate may 
hold particularly strong views regarding their experience. The sample size for this study is 15. It is not 
uncommon for in-depth qualitative studies to apply smaller samples. For example, papers exploring 
nightlife policing in Australia (Wadds 2019) and zonal banning in Denmark (Sogaard 2018) comprised 15 
and ten interview participants respectively. While care is taken not to over-generalise from the findings, 
this study addresses a lack of empirical research in relation to the effects of patron banning. It makes a 
valuable contribution to knowledge in this area, particularly as the VCGLR, the body responsible for 
overseeing barring powers in Victoria, has no knowledge of the way or extent to which the provisions are 
used.9  
 
Research Findings and Discussion 
 
Key descriptive data with respect to the 15 interview participants are summarised in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Interview Participant Data 
 
Age (years) Sex Indigenous 
Australian^ 






>50 M F Yes No Regional* Metropolitan+ <=1  1-3   >3 
3 9 0 3 8 7 0 15 9 6  8 0 7 
Notes: 
^self-reported by interview participant. 
* Regional locations included Geelong, Bendigo and Echuca. 




The reasons given for the imposition of each barring order are set out in Table 2. Compliance with the 
legislated requirements is explored in depth within a separate paper (Farmer 2020) but is considered here 






Clare Farmer: A Civilianised Summary Power to Exclude: Perceptual Deterrence, Compliance and Legitimacy 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         IJCJ&SD       7 
www.crimejusticejournal.com   









      Underage             Theft           Mis-ID’d       Pushed      Unknown 
6 3 2 1 1 1 1 
 
 
Due to the absence of central records, it is not possible to establish any sense of the representativeness of 
this sample. It is not known how many barring orders have been imposed since the implementation of the 
provisions, for what reason(s) orders have been given, where, to whom or for how long.  
 
To examine the deterrent effects of licensee barring, the findings are framed around the manner and extent 
to which each recipient perceived that their ban affected their short and longer term behaviour. Three 
overlapping themes are explored and discussed: compliance and displacement – including commentary 
regarding ban enforcement, emotional and practical effects; barring order legitimacy and associated 
behaviour change; and the perceived potential for barring powers to deter undesirable behaviours.  
 
Compliance and Displacement 
Of the 15 participants, eight stated that they complied with their ban (four male and four female), two 
admitted to actual breaches, and four admitted to attempted breaches. One participant refused to respond 
to this question.  
 
The compliance of four participants was influenced by the perceived risk of being caught attempting to 
breach the ban, particularly where the venue utilised an ID scanner. This complements the recent findings 
by De Andrade et al. (2020) in relation to the use of ID scanners to identify banned patrons in Queensland. 
It points to the potential for a short-term individual deterrent effect, where barring order enforcement is 
proactive and perceived to be effective. One female participant (P4) admitted to returning to the venue to 
test the scanning process to see if she would still be allowed to enter (she was not successful). A male 
participant (P5) explained that the venue from which he had been barred started using their ID scanners 
at a fixed time each evening. As a result, he intentionally entered the licensed venue earlier, and was able 
to avoid detection. Another female participant noted that she was known by the licensee and had been told 
clearly that the police would be called if she was seen anywhere in the vicinity of the venue. Her compliance 
was directly linked to fear of reprisal if she was found breaching her order: 
 
Yes, I complied with the ban … because I was scared … that they would call the police and I 
would be fined $2000. (P1-Female) 
 
One female participant reflected more broadly and expressed fear that the barring order could affect future 
job prospects. This was the only example of longer-term thinking that was discerned from the interviews, 
with respect to potential personal consequences of not complying with a ban: 
 
I definitely am more wary … I’m scared of the consequences… It made me really nervous to 
think that… it could affect my prospects in the future … I thought maybe this could come up as 
a criminal offence or something. (P10-Female) 
 
Embarrassment at being the subject of a barring order was another reason given for compliance. This was 
particularly the case for female recipients, four of whom specifically mentioned embarrassment, with 
comments such as: 
 
I was so embarrassed and went away. (P9-Female)  
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I was genuinely quite embarrassed. That was the overwhelming part of it, that it was 
embarrassing. (P10-Female) 
 
No males reported fear or embarrassment when discussing their feelings about their ban. For male 
recipients, there was evidence of a generally more dismissive response, typified by the following 
comments: 
 
I really don’t give a shit. (P7-Male) 
 
I wasn’t bothered … (P6-Male) 
 
I didn’t think much about it so wasn’t that bothered. (P11-Male) 
 
It is not known the extent to which bravado, hindsight and/or the passage of time has affected these 
perspectives. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the small sample size, there was a notable attitudinal 
difference between male and female respondents. This reflects the individualised nature of deterrability 
and the influence of a range of factors, including gender (Matthews and Agnew 2008; McGrath 2009; Jacobs 
2010). Du Preez and Wadds’ (2016) notion of gendered responsibilisation in the NTE, posits that 
embedded socio-political and cultural expectations ensure that regret and shame are more likely to 
promote responsible behaviour in women. The response of the male recipients in this sample aligns with 
established connections between alcohol consumption, violence, masculine identity and ‘… the symbolic 
rejection of respectable social values’ (Tomsen 1997, p.100; 2008).  
 
Of the six participants who breached or attempted to breach their barring order, two were female and four 
were male. Reasons ranged from a lack of awareness that a barring order had been imposed to explicit 
efforts to circumvent the order. The latter was typified by the male participant who simply ensured that 
he entered the venue before the time at which the ID scanners were activated. Of the two female 
respondents who breached their ban, P2 admitted to swapping IDs to avoid detection, while P3 took a 
more direct approach:  
 
… I went into the venue anyway during the ban period … I [just] had to convince the security 
each week to let me in … (P3-Female) 
 
There were no notable differences in compliance or associated perceptions of barring orders between 
regional and metropolitan locations. Similarly, there were no discernible differences across the age groups 
of participants.  
 
Across the interviewees, the level of compliance was high, but this did not reflect an overwhelming sense 
of renewed lawfulness or any notable transformational behavioural effect of the ban itself. The most 
common response was that the recipient simply decided to go elsewhere. Seven participants emphasised 
that they continued their usual pattern of alcohol consumption and behaviour during their ban, but just 
went to different locations. The following quotes are typical:  
 
I just headed to another pub. (P5-Male) 
 
 … it’s only a sometimes venue so I … went elsewhere … (P9-Female) 
 
… there wasn’t that much of a real effect as there are lots of other places … (P12-Male) 
 
I just went to other bars and clubs … I couldn’t go back there, so I went to other places instead. 
(P15-Male) 
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This aligns with findings of displacement in relation to other exclusionary provisions (Donnelly and 
Poynton 2019; Stafford 2019). Spatial displacement is enabled by the operation of Victoria’s licensee 
barring orders, as recipients are typically only barred from one venue. Even where ID scanners are used 
to manage entry into a venue, individual ban recipients will only be identified if they are barred from that 
particular establishment. As it is generally very easy to just go elsewhere,10 licensee barring orders are 
unlikely to drive tangible behaviour change. To mitigate the effects of displacement, barring would need 
to be more geographically expansive and comprehensively enforced. This would create logistical 
challenges, amplify rights-related concerns in relation to exclusion from public spaces (Farmer 2017, 
2018) and risk further displacement to less visible or domestic settings. The required regimes of 
governance, policing and private security would further challenge tensions between patrons, venues and 
police, and heighten concerns about the application, reach and consequences of discretionary civilianised 
powers to exclude (Farmer 2020; Farmer and Clifford 2020). 
 
Victoria currently does not track the movements of barred patrons between venues or locations. This 
makes the extent and effect of displacement difficult to monitor. It is not known how many barring order 
recipients go on to receive orders at other venues, or any other behaviour related sanction or infringement 
penalty – either concurrently or subsequently. Further research could map the movement of barred 
patrons and identify the extent to which behavioural issues continue during and after the period of a ban.  
 
Perceived Legitimacy and Behavioural Effects 
Only one interviewee accepted the fairness of their order and its imposition without question. Four 
participants regarded their barring order as generally fair and/or appropriate, given the behaviours they 
had exhibited. Three of the four articulated some concern about the manner of imposition, typically due to 
others not receiving the same outcome in comparable circumstances. Across the interviews, the reason for 
the imposition of the barring order was a common concern. Nine of the barring order recipients were given 
reasons that could align with the legislated purpose of licensee barring orders (Table 2), that the recipient 
was ‘drunk, violent or quarrelsome.’ Six reported being given barring orders for reasons that appear to sit 
outside of the legislated scope. Examples include being under-age, stealing, or due to misidentification. 
Farmer (2020) sets out a more detailed examination of barring order imposition and operational 
expectations. Eleven of the interview participants felt that their barring order was unfair; five of whom 
cited anger or irritation at the venue for imposing the barring order, and its perceived unfairness. This 
prompted displacement-driven compliance, but motivated by a determination to punish the venue. For 
example: 
 
[I was] angry and determined to never go back there … I was there with three other people and 
they saw what happened. None of us will go back there again. We have told as many people as 
we can. If I can be affected, then anyone can. It’s really unfair. (P13-Male) 
 
The discretionary nature of barring orders, their civilian imposition, and the absence of review 
mechanisms (Farmer 2019, 2020; Farmer and Clifford 2020) may serve to increase perceptions of 
unfairness and anger, which in turn risks creating an additional layer of tension and potential conflict. At 
best, disgruntled patrons may take their irritation elsewhere, at worst it may fuel hostility with staff at the 
barring venue. The nature of the participant recruitment means that the sample may skew towards 
individuals who harbour a grievance about their barring order. Nevertheless, the interviews suggest an 
association between perceived legitimacy, compliance and the potential effect of a barring order on the 
future behaviours of recipients. The effects are nuanced, particularly where fear played a part in 
compliance for recipients who also regarded their barring order as unfair. However, where barring orders 
are perceived to lack legitimacy this may exacerbate rather than reduce undesirable behaviour.  
 
Participants were asked to reflect upon the longer-term effect of the ban upon their attitudes – to consider 
the extent to which the barring order acted as a transitional event. Seven reported no longer-term effect 
upon their attitudes or behaviours. This correlated closely with those who perceived their barring order 
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to be unfair or unreasonable. Eight participants admitted to being smarter about their actions after 
receiving their ban. This included actively avoiding direct contact with certain venue staff: 
 
… it made me have less faith in security guards. It also made me more cautious of what I was 
doing and who was around me. (P5-Male) 
 
It has changed my attitude towards security guards at venues and venues themselves. I’m more 
sceptical of their capability of basic reasoning and questioning… and less likely to assist them 
when unruly people are around. (P6-Male) 
 
It changed my behaviour at that venue, to be more aware and made me identify certain security 
guards more than others – to watch their behaviour change. (P9-Female) 
 
This finding further challenges expectations that barring orders will drive more positive patron 
behaviours. More than half of those interviewed actively sought ways to circumvent or modify the effects 
of their exclusion. When combined with the potential for displacement and lack of effective enforcement, 
the deterrent effect of barring orders remains far from conclusive. 
 
Three respondents acknowledged a discernible change in their outlook and/or behaviours following their 
barring order – all were female. When asked about the effect of the barring order upon their peer group, 
while the responses can only reflect the perceptions of participants, the same three female interviewees 
were the only respondents to identify a discernible change in attitude or behaviour among their family or 
friends. Within a general reflection of the effect of banning, one set out the differences between male and 
female responses more explicitly: 
 
I would definitely say the girls over the boys have definitely changed their perceptions and 
attitude towards everything the most … I would say bans had a stronger effect on the girls. (P2-
Female) 
 
A different perspective was presented by P1 who, despite the fear she felt, asserted that the way in which 
her barring order was imposed actively negated any potential longer-term effect. For P1, the perceived 
lack of legitimacy removed any need for a change in behaviour: 
 
… no, it doesn’t make me behave any differently. I’m just amazed that licensees can do this out 
of the blue … (P1 – Female) 
 
While these are individual reactions, they support a need to examine regulation and associated behaviours 
in the NTE through a gendered lens (Du Preez and Wadds 2016; Moore et al. 2020; Nicholls 2018). 
 
The concerns articulated by the interviewees point to a risk that licensee misuse of barring powers may 
undermine their legitimacy and limit the potential beneficial effects - the issue of misuse is examined in 
more depth by Farmer (2020). This risk to the perceived legitimacy of barring is arguably bolstered by the 
absence of scrutiny of the provisions, including the lack of any central records. Put simply, licensees know 
that their use of barring powers is not monitored, and this creates an inherent risk of their inappropriate 
application. One option to address this deficiency and to strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the 
provisions would be to introduce formal consequences for licensees found to have misused their powers. 
In Queensland, in principle support has been given to the introduction of an offence of the vexatious 
imposition of a barring order (Miller et al. 2019; Queensland Government 2019). Such a mechanism may 
serve to increase the perceived legitimacy of barring provisions and, in turn, may enhance their deterrent 
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Potential Deterrent Effects of Barring 
All of the participants acknowledged the potential beneficial effects of licensee barring order provisions. 
There were no objections to the principle of exclusion, and all interviewees perceived that barring could 
deter problematic behaviours. A number of common prerequisites were articulated all of which embodied 
expectations of operational legitimacy. Participants expected bans to be imposed fairly, consistently, and 
openly, and to be enforced effectively. The potential for licensee barring to have a tangible effect on the 
behaviour and decision-making both of recipients and the wider community was set out clearly, but with 
caveats: 
 
I think it [a ban] serves a purpose and I think that it works at changing peoples’ behaviours, 
however not so much when they aren’t abided by… because if people see someone being 
banned then they are unlikely to repeat the behaviour in fear of also being banned. (P3 – 
Female) 
 
Sometimes I believe it can have the reverse effect than what is intended. But it may also make 
people realise that they did the wrong thing and learn their lesson the hard way. (P4 – Female) 
 
I think that when complied with and when given to the right people, they change attitudes and 
behaviours and make people (particularly males) scared and worried about doing the same 
behaviours. (P5 – Male) 
 
For this sample, the operation of licensee barring order powers and associated perceptions of the fairness 
and proportionality of their imposition are key markers for the potential beneficial effects of the 
provisions. That barring orders are not currently regarded as inherently fair, appears to be the primary 
reason for the limited enduring deterrent effects reported by the participants. The way in which barring 
orders are used, enforced and monitored has a fundamental effect upon their capacity to act as a 
meaningful deterrent to anti-social, violent and other unacceptable behaviours within licensed venues. 
This aligns closely with the expectations of procedural justice and legitimacy that we see in relation to 




Patron banning is a tangible, straightforward, low cost, and politically expedient response to alcohol-
related behavioural issues. However, any policy that permits the civilian imposition of a police-enforceable 
sanction should be supported by demonstrable evidence of effect, and its operation subject to meaningful 
and ongoing oversight. In Victoria, the Charter mandates empirical evidence to support any measure which 
limits an individual right, regardless of how undesirable or troublesome that individual may be perceived 
to be. Licensee barring orders limit freedom to move and circumvent the presumption of innocence, but 
they have operated for nearly a decade without any evidence of their presumed deterrent effects. There is 
no data available to enable or inform an examination of the use of licensee barring powers in Victoria. We 
do not know how many barring orders have been imposed, for what reason(s), where, to whom or for how 
long. As no data are collected, it is not known what proportion of venue barring order recipients 
participated in this study, or to what extent the sample mirrors barring order imposition patterns or 
recipient demographics.  
 
For those interviewed, fear, embarrassment or anger underpinned short-term compliance. There is little 
evidence of perceptual deterrence or longer term behaviour change. Ban recipients were not notably 
affected by the likelihood, celerity or severity of a further ban (Becker 1968; Mann et al. 2016). 
Displacement was the most common short and longer-term effect of the barring order. Going somewhere 
else was a practical response for the duration of the ban and, for some, a more principled reaction when 
the recipient objected to the legitimacy of the ban. This response may result in a reduction in behavioural 
issues at one location, but not necessarily in general. This mirrors findings in relation to other regulatory 
responses, most notably Sydney’s lockout provisions (Donnelly and Poynton 2019). For Victoria’s licensee 
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barring orders, any short-term deterrent effect within specific venues must be understood within a wider 
context of the potential displacement of banned patrons to other venues, and/or the continuation of 
problematic behaviours in other public areas or at home.  
 
Patron banning individualises the risk and regulation of problematic behaviours (Crawford 2003; Room 
2012). However, if individual deterrence is marked by compliance, the deterrent effect of barring orders 
appears to be, at best, short-term. Most of the interview participants perceived that their ban had no 
transformative effect upon their outlook or behaviours. Admissions about being smarter in their 
interactions with venue staff, and actively concealing their behaviours demonstrate how bans can be 
circumvented to further diminish their effect. Every participant acknowledged the potential merits of 
barring order powers and agreed that bans could lead to behaviour change. But their effectiveness, as a 
deterrent and as a driver for broader behavioural change, is inextricably linked to the perceived fairness 
of the provisions, the consistency and predictability of imposition, effective enforcement, and an overall 
sense of justice and legitimacy. These essential preconditions were not evident for, or perceived by, the 
majority of the study’s participants. 
 
None of the participants regarded intoxication as the primary reason for their barring order, and none 
admitted to an alcohol-induced reduction in cognisance at the time of their ban. The subsequent 
displacement decisions, proactive attempts to circumvent the bans, and articulation of anger and 
embarrassment all suggest a high level of ongoing rational thought in relation to the bans, and pre-
planning of responses – many of which do not reflect the deterrent-related behavioural and community 
safety improvements asserted by proponents of the provisions during the 2011 parliamentary debates 
(Legislative Assembly 2011; Legislative Council 2011). 
 
The gendered nature of the findings, particularly in relation to compliance, highlights the need for further 
research to identify and examine the different responses of male and female recipients. Despite extensive 
research exploring gendered behaviours in the NTE (Graham and Livingston 2012; Nicholls 2018; Tomsen 
1997, 2008), gender per se is rarely the focus of alcohol policy (Duncan et al. 2020; Moore et al. 2017, 
2020). Responses tend to be generic, targeting alcohol consumption, regulation and general control. The 
belligerence evident from some male respondents, while moderated by the size of the sample, highlights 
potential challenges for discretionary, civilianised punishments within the NTE – particularly with respect 
to enforcement. Licensee barring orders can be imposed on-the-spot by individuals without the implied 
authority or legitimacy of a police officer. In circumstances where a barring order is perceived as 
unwarranted, this may increase the risk of conflict between patrons and venue staff. This may be 
exacerbated should ID scanners be used more widely to enforce barring order provisions, particularly if 
their use by venue staff is confrontational or provokes aggressive reactions (Graham and Homel 2008; 
Graham and Livingston 2012; Hobbs et al. 2003; Monaghan 2002; Wadds 2015). 
 
Licensee barring orders have been operational in Victoria since 2011 without monitoring, analysis, or 
parliamentary scrutiny. Their legislative framing actively prevents the central collection of data. As a 
result, licensee barring exists in an accountability vacuum – without any understanding of how many have 
been imposed or what effects they may have had. A similar lack of scrutiny is evident with respect to patron 
banning more broadly across Australia (Farmer et al. 2018; Farmer, Clifford and Miller 2020). The 
deterrent effects of spatial exclusion continue to be largely presumed but not subject to meaningful 
oversight or analysis. 
 
The findings of this study acknowledge the potential value of licensee barring but question its effectiveness 
as a tangible deterrent or an agent for behaviour change. Licensee barring orders place a police-
enforceable summary power in the hands of non-law enforcement and non-judicial officers, without any 
oversight of its use. This lack of scrutiny creates a clear risk of misuse, with an attendant effect on the 
perceived legitimacy of the provisions and a greater likelihood of transgression or patron-venue conflict. 
In addition to further research to examine the particular effects of banning, a review of the operation of 
Victoria’s licensee barring powers is recommended, along with consideration of specific legislative 
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changes. These include the creation of a centralised record of barring orders to enable their use to be 
understood and to facilitate effective ongoing monitoring; the proactive mapping of barred patrons in 
relation to concurrent and subsequent arrests, orders or infringement provisions; and the introduction of 
an offence to address the risk of the vexatious use of licensee barring powers. 
 
 
Correspondence: Dr Clare Farmer, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Deakin University, Geelong Waurn 
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